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In Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (1994),
Ernest Gellner asks why the polities of the west have proved so
much more successful than their rivals in the east. He insists that the
correct answer is not democracy — nor even a constitutional scheme
of legally protected individual liberties — but rather the «miracle of
Civil Society.»1 «Civil society,» as Gellner defines it, «is that set of
diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to
counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from
fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace… can nevertheless prevent it
from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.»2
Civil society here is presented chiefly in its negative function of
counter-balancing the state. The idea comes from Montesquieu,
who held that liberty is found only in moderate governments,
«where power must check power by the arrangement of things.»3
James Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville likewise held that social
pluralism, factions, private associations should be valued, among
1 E GELLNER, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (New York: The Pen-
guin Press, 1994), p. 32.
2 GELLNER, 5.
3 MONTESQUIEU, Spirit of the Laws, 11.4. 
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other reasons, because they “check” the despotic tendencies of dem-
ocratic regimes.
Gellner points out that the power-checking-power model cap-
tures only one of the values we assign to civil society: namely, liberty
from the extrinsic authority of the state. To say that civil society is
the «social residue left when the state is subtracted» is descriptively
true, but it is not enough.4 For once we subtract the power of the
state, we can be trapped in a suffocating world of social forms and
norms. Islamic nations, for example, have rather weak states, but a
strong Umma (way of life) that pervades society. In the more fully
mature societies of the West, civil society is also valued because it
emancipates us from the familial and religious powers which can
command our obedience and allegiance. Here, Gellner diverges
from Tocqueville’s conception of civil society as “intermediate” or
“secondary” powers.5 For Gellner, civil society constitutes a zone of
immunity from these secondary (or intermediate) commanding
powers. The “miracle” of civil society is the liberty of individuals to
freely choose their identities, careers, and associations. 
Because civil society is not a sphere of ruling powers of any sort,
it must be understood on the model of the economic market.6 Market
order arises not from the commands of the state, but from the choices
and preferences of free agents; at the same time, a commercial society
will tend to weaken fixed social forms and norms. Thus, the “miracle”
of civil society, is what Gellner calls the “modular man.” 
«The moral order has not committed itself either to a set of
prescribed roles and relations, or to a set of practices. The
same goes for knowledge: conviction can change, without
any stigma of apostasy. Yet these highly specific, unsancti-
fied, instrumental, revocable links or bonds are effective.
4 GELLNER, 212.
5 TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America, II.4.2.
6 GELLNER (at 88) makes this point very crisply: «political pluralism in terms of inde-
pendent or autonomous coercive units is out. Local units simply lack adequate weight. Lib-
erty, on the other hand, is impossible without pluralism, without a balance of power. As it
cannot be political, it must be economic.» 
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The associations of modular man can be effective without
being rigid.»7
Gellner’s account is intended to be both descriptive and nor-
mative. This is the way civil society functions in the societies of the
West, and this is precisely the order of liberty that liberals ought to
defend. One can admit that the modeling of civil society upon the
order of the market has enormous appeal. As the French social the-
orist, Pierre Manent, has pointed out: «Liberalism eroded social
commands and individual will. But it also has a remedy for that ero-
sion. Amid the discrediting of every norm, it retains one: competi-
tiveness. This is one of the principal reasons that liberalism has come
back into favor. Everyone in liberal society shrinks at the prospect of
giving or receiving a genuine order, since nothing seems to justify
commands or obedience. Competition therefore remains the only
acceptable candidate for social regulation, since the norm it offers is
immanent to social activity. It is imposed on no one, it implies no
dogmatism».8
Since the mid 19th century, Catholic social thought has inter-
sected with the liberal program on the need to limit and check the
powers of the modern state. Indeed, if we study papal social teach-
ing, we will see that popes have been preoccupied with this prob-
lem. When John Paul II was elected pope in 1978, his predecessors
had already issued 309 encyclicals and other teaching letters, with
some 120 encyclicals on the state.9 From 1775 until 1978, the inau-
7 GELLNER, p. 100.
8 P. MANENT, “The Contest for Command,” New French Thought, Mark Lilla, ed.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), at p. 185.
9 The Acta Apostolicae Sedis contains twenty five different kinds of papal pronounce-
ments. During the pontificate of Pius XII a serious effort was made to standardize the
typology. My enumeration of what counts as encyclicals follows the eight-volume Enchiri-
dion delle Encicliche (Edizioni Dehoniane 1994-98), which includes: encyclical letters (lit-
terae encyclicae), two kinds of epistles (epistula encyclica, epistula apostolica), two species of
apostolic letters (litterae apostolicae: motu proprio, brevia apostolica), and beginning with
Pius XII (1922-39) a few radio messages (nuntii radiophonici) which were intended to do
the work of an encyclical. This leaves to one side four other species of papal documents
Russell Hittinger 387
gural encyclical of every pope addressed the problem of the state.
Once the popes came to grips with the new state-making regimes
which emerged after the Napoleonic Wars, they vigorously
defended a principle of social pluralism. To this extent, and by
virtue of having a common enemy, Catholic social thought and (what
used to be called) Liberalism both called attention to the importance
of civil society vis-à-vis the state; both developed rights-based argu-
ments in defense of civil society. 
Despite these similarities, the Catholic and Liberal discourse
about social pluralism remained quite different. In the first place,
while liberals valued civil society principally for instrumental (the
power-checking-power) reasons, Catholic social thought empha-
sized the intrinsic value of social forms like the family, the private
school, churches, and labor unions. In the second place, Catholic
social thought has always been suspicious of the market model of
social pluralism. Though Catholic thinkers would have no difficulty
defending the economic market against Socialism, they remained
wary of any effort to make society itself conform to a market. What
Gellner celebrates as the “modular man” represents very nearly the
opposite of the social pluralism defended in Catholic social thought
and teaching.
In order to appreciate how the ideas of social pluralism and
subsidiarity can harbor quite different social ontologies, we shall
investigate the idea of the munus regale — the function, mission,
gift, or vocation of ruling. As we shall see, the munus regale origi-
nated in theological reflection upon the sacred offices of Christ as
priest, prophet, and king, and how these munera are participated by
every baptised person. Since the pontificate of Pius XI (1922-1939),
the theme of the munus regale was applied beyond its original chris-
tological and ecclesiological boundaries to the offices, rights, and
duties of social institutions. Especially in the social doctrine
expounded by this papal magisterium, the idea of the munus regale
is a keystone for understanding why the liberal conception of civil
which convey teaching, and which have been used extensively by John Paul II: adhortatio
apostolica, constitutiones apostolicae, homiliae, allocutiones. 
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liberties, rights, and social pluralism needs to be preserved and cor-
rected by an ontology of the human person as a “royal creature”
who participates in divine ruling powers.
II.
John Paul expounds the theme of ruling and being ruled in ref-
erence to two sections of Lumen gentium, the Dogmatic Constitu-
tion on the Church, issued by the Second Vatican Council on 21
November 1964. 
The first is LG §36, where the Council fathers speak of Christ
constituting his disciples “in a royal freedom” [in regali libertati]
and teaching them what it means to enjoy the property or virtue of
ruling [regalitas, which is usually translated “being a king”]. Here,
Lumen Gentium asserts that revelation teaches that “To serve is to
reign” [servire regnare est]. The first and final word of Scripture on
ruling power is that whoever rules must serve rather than be served.
The second is LG §31, where the laity are said to participate in the
munera Christi — the priestly, prophetic, and kingly offices of
Christ. 
Intrigued by repeated use of the word munus in the documents
of Vatican II, Janet Smith discovered that the word was used at least
248 times by the Council. Though the English translation is some-
times erratic, the Latin typical edition of the Catechismus Catholicae
Ecclesiae (1997), uses the word munus at least 125 times. (Signifi-
cantly, the principle of subsidiarity is discussed explicitly in the con-
text of the distribution of munera by Divine Providence, see espe-
cially §§1883-1884). On my count, the 1983 Code of Canon law uses
the word 189 times.
The word munus is usually, but badly, translated into English as
“function.” Living as we do in an age of machines and biological
reductionism, the word “function” is apt to conjure the wrong
meaning. In pre-Christian Rome the word munus meant the ancient
Etruscan ritual of serving the dead by shedding blood on (or in the
vicinity) of ancestral graves. This was the origin of the gladiatorial
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contest. The earliest recorded munus in the city of Rome was given
at the Forum Boarium in 264 by Junius Pera in memory of his father.
The gladiatorial contest was not called a “game” (ludus) but rather a
“service” (munus) by which the dead are revivified and propitiated
by blood. In other contexts it signified a duty or a gift of service.
Hence, the word munificent is from the Latin munificus, generous,
bountiful. At law, a munus was not to be confused with a donatio,
which signifies the disposal of property. We can suppose that the
word community, communitas, derives from the sharing of gifts, not
from the transfer of property.10 The word munus is frequently used
in the Vulgate translation — repeatedly, for example, to give the cor-
responding Latin word for various aspects of Jewish ritual. In Mt.
2.11, the Magi give munera to the Christ child; the same for the
widow’s mite in Lk. 21.1, and for the sacrifice of the high priest in
Epistle to the Heb. 8.3. And Christian theologians spoke of the
triplex munus Christi: priest, prophet, and king.11
Pius XI (1922-29), to whom we attribute the teachings on social
justice and subsidiarity, is the pope who began to systematically
develop the ontology of the munera. During his pontificate, individ-
uals, families, corporations, churches, the state itself,12 and even
10 Or a gift received: Hence, as Leo XIII so wisely taught in Rerum Novarum: «who-
ever has received from the divine bounty a large share of temporal blessings [quicumque
maiorem copian bonorum Dei munere accepit], whether they be external and corporeal, or
gifts of the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the perfecting of his
own nature [ad perfectionem], and, at the same time, that he may employ them, as the stew-
ard of God’s Providence, for the benefit of others.» John XXIII, Mater et Magistra §119,
AAS/53 (1961) at 430. Citing Rerum Novarum §22 [Acta Leonis, 11 (1891) at 114.
11 Catechism of the Catholic Church (1997), §436, §§784-85. 
12 «We have indicated how a sound prosperity is to be restored according to the true
principles of a sane corporative system which respects the proper hierarchic structure of
society; and how all the occupational groups should be fused into a harmonious unity
inspired by the principle of the common good. And the genuine and chief munus of public
and civil authority consists precisely in the efficacious furthering of this harmony and coor-
dination of all social forces.» Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris §31, AAS/29 (1937), at 81. And
Pius XII in Summi Pontificatus (1939): «it is the noble prerogative and munus of the civitas
to control, aid and direct the private and individual activities of national life that they con-
verge harmoniously towards the common good.» §59; EE6 46, AAS/31 433. Designed to
assist and coordinate «the natural perfection of man,» the civitas is said to be quasi instru-
mentum. On the state having an instrumental munus, see too John XXIII in Pacem in Ter-
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international authorities,13 were said to be the bearers not only of
iura (rights) but also of munera — of having roles to play, gifts to
give. In the deepest sense, human rights are exemplified in munera,
whether natural or supernatural.14 In the Pian encyclicals, the con-
cept of subsidiarity is elucidated first in the idea of a plurality of
munera, and only secondarily in terms related to the political ques-
tion of the scope and content of state assistance. Thus, the notion of
the munus unifies two things which are so often split apart in mod-
ern political and social thought: first, what man claims as his own,
and second, what man has to give as a gift of service. 
We do not know exactly who or what moved Pius XI to bring
the sacral language of munera into the precincts of ethical and juridi-
cal discourse.15 Pius was formed in the Thomism of the Leonine
ris, §68; ASS/55 (1963) at 276. And linking together iura and munera of the citizen, see
Pacem in Terris, §77, ASS/55 (1963) at 279. 
13 See, too, JOHN XXIII in Pacem in Terris: «But it is no part of the duty of universal
authority to limit the sphere of action of the public authority of individual States, or to arro-
gate any of their functions to itself. On the contrary, its essential purpose is to create world
conditions in which the public authorities of each nation, its citizens and intermediate
groups, can carry out their tasks, fullfill their duties and claim their rights with greater secu-
rity» [sed etiam singuli homines et interposti coetus possint tutius sua munera obire, sua
praestare officia, sua iure vindicare]. Pacem in Terris (11 April 1963), §141; AAS/55 (1963),
at 295. At §145, the UN is said to have munera. 
14 On the matrimonial munus as a natural and supernatural participation in divine
rule: «Nor must We omit to remark, in fine, that since the duty entrusted to parents for the
good of their children [hoc munus parentibus in bonum prolis commissum] is of such high
dignity and of such great importance, every use of the faculty given by God for the procre-
ation of new life is the right and the privilege of the married state alone, by the law of God
and of nature, and must be confined absolutely within the sacred limits of that state [intra
sacros connubii limites est omnino continendus].»  Pius XI, Casti Connubii, §18; AAS/22
(1930) at 546. And see again how John XXIII works with the same idea: «It is of the utmost
importance that parents exercise their right and obligation toward the younger generation
by securing for their children a sound cultural and religious formation. They must also edu-
cate them to a deep sense of responsibility in life, especially in such matters as concern the
foundation of a family and the procreation and education of children. They must instill in
them an unshakable confidence in Divine Providence and a determination to accept the
inescapable sacrifices and hardships involved in so noble and important a task [munus] as
the co-operation with God in the transmitting of human life and the bringing up of chil-
dren». JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra §195, AAS/53 (1961) at 448.
15 My guess is that the impetus came from a relatively little known encyclical, Annum
Sacrum (1899). In preparation for the 1900 Jubilee, Leo XIII dedicated the human race to
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revival, and was trained under one of Leo’s chief teachers, Matteo
Liberatore. Liberatore and his mentor, Luigi Taparelli, had adapted
Thomism to the political and social disputes of the era. Taparelli is
credited with having introduced the term “social justice” and for
having made the first systematic case for what Pius XI will later call
“subsidiarity.” Both of the Italian Jesuits developed a Thomistic
account of natural rights.16 During the Leonine period, individuals
and associations are usually said to bear iura et officia, rights and
responsibilities.17 With Pius XI, however, the munera are intro-
duced, and with this term came a new layer of meanings. 
My guess that the idea of munus holds together the Aristotelian
notion of an ergon or characteristic function with the more biblical
concept of vocation or mission. In so doing, it gets at something not
well developed by conventional Thomism. Let us recall that at the
the Sacred Heart of Jesus, claimed to have been miraculously healed by intercessionary
prayers to the Sacred Heart, and pointed to Christ as the superior model for what it means
to rule. In fact, more subsequent encyclicals are written in reference to Annum Sacrum that
to Rerum Novarum (Pius XI will write four encyclicals on the Sacred Heart, and Pius XII
will write three). Beginning with this late Leonine encyclical, popes begin to speak more and
more of Christ’s munera and of his ruling powers. In Ubi Arcano (1922), Pius XI dedicated
his pontificate to the Regnum Christi. Then, in a series of encyclicals — Quas Primas (1925),
Miserentissimus Redemptor (1928), Rappresentanti in Terra (1929), Caritate Christi (1932),
and Divini Redemptoris (1937) — he began to explicate the analogies between Christ’s
munus regale and the rights and munera of baptized Christians. Pius XII did the same.
Indeed, his first encyclical, Summi Pontificatus (1939), written to respond to the eruption of
the Second World War, begins with an interpretation of Leo’s Annum Sacrum. In sum, this
line of Christological thought became intertwined with “social doctrine.” A reminder of this
interweave can be seen in Lumen Gentium §36, where the munera of the laity are discussed
in light of the preface of the Feast of Christ the King, the feast instituted by Pius XI. 
16 See R. JACQUIN, Taparelli (1943), 157-243. 
17 Sometimes we see the older Leonine formula used side by side with the newer
notion of munera. For example, John XXIII in Pacem in Terris: «It is generally accepted
today that the common good is best safeguarded when personal rights and duties [iuribus
et officiis] are guaranteed. The chief concern of civil authorities must therefore be to ensure
that these rights are recognized, respected, co-ordinated, defended and promoted, and that
each individual is enabled to perform his duties [officiis] more easily. For to safeguard the
inviolable rights [inviolabilia iura] of the human person, and to facilitate the performance
of his duties [ut facilius quisque suis muneribus defungatur], is the principal duty of every
public authority.» Pacem in Terris §60, AAS/55 (1963) at 274. Citing Pius XII, Nuntius
Radiophonicus, Pentecost 1941 [AAS/33 (1941), 200. 
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time of Pius XI’s pontificate, the overriding issue of social doctrine
was not merely whether man is a social animal, naturally ordered to
the common good, but more exactly, the status of societies and
social roles other than the state.18 It was these societies — families,
youth groups, unions, religious orders — which the totalitarian
regimes robbed of their legal personality. Therefore, it wasn’t
enough to just repeat the standard formulae of commutative, dis-
tributive and legal justice. Without social content, these formulae
serve no useful purpose. In fact, arguments to the common good can
prove counter-productive in the face of the modern state, which is
more than happy to make common the entire range of goods. 
In any event, Pius XI decided to make clear that rights are not
derived from human nature abstractly considered, but rather from
human nature as already bearing (implicitly or explicitly) social
munera. On this view, rights flow from antecedent munera (gifts,
duties, vocations, missions); hence, it is quite different than the idea
of a right as an immunity — immunitas, etymologically, implies the
absence of a munus. It is quite true that immunities are a juridical
term of art; every well-developed legal system recognizes immunities
of various sorts. Pius XI, however, insisted that principles of social
order cannot begin with immunities or with negative rights. We first
must understand the munera which the immunities protect. 
I might add that one of the reasons commentators have had
such problems understanding the term “social justice” is that, for
Pius XI, social justice is nothing other than the manifold organicity
of the common good; or, to put it in another way, it is the demand
that the common good be brought about through organizations,
institutions, and groups. According to Pius XI, social justice ensues
«when each individual member is given what it needs for the exer-
cise of its proper function….all that is necessary for the exercise of
18 See PIUS XII in Summi Pontificatus: «man and the family are by nature anterior to
the State, and that the Creator has given to both of them powers and rights [iura facul-
tatesque] and has assigned them a mission [munus] and a charge that correspond to unde-
niable natural requirements.» §61, AAS/31 at 434.
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his social munus…»19 Social justice, therefore, should not be con-
fused with distributive justice. On the assumption that men and
women already have munera, indeed, that they are already perform-
ing acts which redound to the common good, the role of the politi-
cal community is facilitative.20 All issues of social justice encounter
munera already established in and ordered to a common good. And
therefore, when the political authority recognizes and helps to coor-
dinate the social roles and vocations, it is not in the first place a ques-
tion of distributive justice; for the magistrate does not distribute the
munera which have been assigned by creation and redemption;
rather, by recognizing these munera (including the function of the
state itself), the magistrate is recognizing a legal justice that neither
begins nor terminates in the state. 
Subsidiarity, therefore, is a principle derivative from social jus-
tice: namely, that when subsidium be given either by the parts to the
whole or the whole to the parts the plurality of functions or munera
should not be destroyed or absorbed.21
19 «In reality, besides commutative justice, there is also social justice with its own set
obligations, from which neither employers nor workingmen can escape. Now it is of the
very essence of social justice to demand for each individual all that is necessary for the com-
mon good. But just as in the living organism it is impossible to provide for the good of the
whole unless each single part and each individual member is given what it needs for the
exercise of its proper function, so it is impossible to care for the social organism and the
good of society as a unit unless each single part and each individual member — that is to
say, each individual man in the dignity of his human personality — is supplied with all that
is necessary for the exercise of his social munus [ad sociale munus cuiusque suum
exercendum]. If social justice be satisfied, the result will be an intense activity in economic
life as a whole, pursued in tranquillity and order. This activity will be proof of the health of
the social body, just as the health of the human body is recognized in the undisturbed reg-
ularity and perfect efficiency of the whole organism». Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris (19
March 1937), §51, AAS/29 (1937) at 92.
20 The best case for putting social justice under legal justice is made by Jeremiah
Newman, Foundations of Justice (1954). Newman discusses why Catholic thinkers were
reluctant to ascribe social justice to the virtue of legal justice. It looked too close to duties
to the state. Given the fact that the whole point of social justice was to clarify the limited
duties of the state itself, it was understandable that thinkers recoiled from the idea of legal
justice. But Newman makes a powerful case for social justice signifying an ordering to com-
mon goods which are not reducible to the state. When the state does social justice, it is rec-
ognizing the ordering of all society to the divine good. 
21 Such as craft and work: «For, according to Christian teaching, man, endowed with
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At the recent Synod of Bishops (Oct. 2001) in Rome, bishops
debated the applicability of subsidiarity to ecclesiology. Liberals, of
course, contended that Petrine authority is merely a steering device
for the activities of local churches, and such churches embody the
principle of responsibility discharged at the lowest level. Several
bishops responded that subsidiarity is a social and economic doc-
trine that has no immediate applicability to the constitution of the
Church. It seems to me that neither position is quite right.22 Sub-
sidiarity does not tell us who has which function or munus. One has
to look elsewhere (natural law, positive law, divine law) for the
munera. Therefore, subsidiarity cannot be used to settle the debates
about the ontology or the distribution of munera; rather, it is a prin-
ciple governing the relations of already-distributed functions. In
papal teachings since Pius XI, subsidiarity is proposed as a principle
of non-absorption, not a principle that necessarily requires devolu-
tion. As it is commonly understood, devolution is the opposite of
subsidiarity. For devolution presupposes either: (a) an ontological
deficiency, measured by a kind of cost-benefit analysis, or (b) that
the central government rightly possesses a plenary power that it has
now decided to redistribute to other powers and authorities.
a social nature, is placed on this earth so that by leading a life in society and under an
authority ordained of God he may fully cultivate and develop all his faculties unto the
praise and glory of his Creator; and that by faithfully fulfilling the duties of his craft or other
calling he may obtain for himself [atque artis aliusve vocationis suae munere fideliter] tem-
poral and at the same time eternal happiness. Socialism, on the other hand, wholly ignoring
and indifferent to this sublime end of both man and society, affirms that human association
has been instituted for the sake of material advantage alone.» Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno
(15 May 1931), §118; AAS/23 (1931) at 215.
22 See the debate between Cardinal Dulles and Ladislas Orsy (America, Oct. 21, Nov.
25, 2001), which included a brisk exchange about subsidiarity and ecclesiology. Dulles
argued: «Subsidiarity as a technical notion can only with great difficulty be applied to the
church, since the Petrine office was not founded as a ‘subsidiary,’ as if to supply for the defi-
ciencies of lower governmental offices.» Put in just this way, without further qualification,
Dulles is right. The liberals are using “subsidiarity” as a political principle requiring deci-
sions to be made at the lowest possible level. But as I explain, subsidiarity does not have to
be construed so narrowly. Questions of scale, locality, and deficiency do not determine the
principle, but rather are (or can be) considerations with respect to the application of the
principle. 
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First, the principle does not require “lowest possible level” but
rather the “proper level.” The proprium is not determined by size or
locality. Second, subsidiarity does not per se imply a deficiency in the
person or office receiving the subsidium. The family receives help
from the wider political community, but that does not mean that the
family is itself “deficient” — rather it means that the family’s unique
munus does not constitute the entirety of the common good, and it
is entirely natural for the family to rely upon institutions other than
itself. So, too, in Roman Catholic ecclesiology, the Petrine office
assists the entire Church in preserving doctrine and maintaining
unity, but it’s not quite right to use the language of interventions and
deficiency. Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity itself protects the
special office and munus of the Petrine ministry, just as it protects
the unique offices and munera of all the different vocations. None of
this depends immediately upon the issues of scale, locality, or defi-
ciency.23 Third, sometimes there really is a deficiency. A family, for
example, can come apart at the seams, and another power has to
intervene to assist; or a higher ecclesiastical authority must intervene
in the self-governance of a religious order, chapter, or whatever. Sub-
sidiarity in this kind of case demands that the intervention have as its
goal the restoration rather than the absorption or elimination of the
function, mission, role of the institution being assisted.24 Fourth, as I
have already pointed out, subsidiarity does not govern the distribu-
tion of offices; rather, the distribution is governed by natural law and
divine law (or human positive law). Subsidiarity cannot create a
social ontology, and it would be useless or even destructive to make
23 In his influential work Social Ethics (1949), J. Messner asserts: «The law of sub-
sidiarity function is the expression of the pluralism as well as of the harmony and hierarchy
of the juridical order.» At 196-97, he notes that subsidiarity is not exclusively a downward
moving logic, but can also include obligations of “lower” bodies to the whole. (at 197). 
24 In The State in Catholic Thought (1950), at 302f, Heinrich Rommen observes that
Pius XI’s Quadragesimo emphasizes the non-absorption (rehabilitation) of the proprium —
what properly belongs to an agent or institution. Therefore, subsidiarity is not in the first
place an issue of scale, e.g. the lowest possible power. The new Catechism of the Catholic
Church follows suit. Quoting Pius XI’s Quadragesimo, assistance is to be given in light of
the propriis officiis, according to the proper offices or stations (§1883). 
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subsidiarity do that kind of work.25 Any application of the principle
of subsidiarity ahead of the distribution of offices and powers is to
put the cart before the horse. For the question of just relations
between social offices and institutions presupposes the existence of
these social forms, each having its own esse proprium. And where the
nature and scope of these social forms is in doubt, subsidiarity
remains a principle without matter. 
As I understand it, this is why Pius XI and Pius XII began to
apply the idea of munera beyond their original meaning in theology.
It is worth noting that in some 30 Pian encyclicals, the word ius
(“right”) is used more than 400 times; in 93% of the time, the word
is attributed to an authority or to a source of responsibility other
than the state. Furthermore, when Pius attributes a “right” to the
state it is almost always connected to the responsibility of the state to
recognize and protect prior rights — of the family, spouses, chil-
dren; of God, the Church, local ecclesiastical authority, and its sem-
inaries, schools, and charitable organizations; of property, labor,
association.26 But what organizes the ever accumulating list of rights
25 Thinkers in the Reformed tradition have shrewdly observed that Catholic discus-
sion of subsidiarity sometimes elides over the social ontology of diverse institutions, as
though subsidiarity were itself the structural principle of pluralism. See Jonathan Chaplin,
“Subsidiarity as a Political Norm,” in Political Theory and Christian Vision, eds., Jonathan
Chaplin and Paul Marshall (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994). Chaplin
rightly points out that this is a misreading of Catholic social doctrine. See also Chaplin’s dis-
cussion of the distinction and the relation of “subsidiarity” and “sphere sovereignty” in
“Subsidiarity and Sphere Sovereignty: Catholic and Reformed Conceptions of the Role of
the State,” in Things Old and New: Catholic Social Teaching Revisited, eds., Francis P.
McHugh and Samuel M. Natale (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), pp.
175-202. It seems to me that once we attend to the theme of the munera we can discover
something more than a superficial similarity between the Catholic understanding of sub-
sidiarity and the neo-Calvinist principle of “sphere sovereignty” developed by Abraham
Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd. 
26 This word count is in Mary Elsbernd, Papal Statements on Rights: A historical Con-
textual Study of Encyclical Teaching From Pius VI – Pius XI (1791-1939). Dissertation.
Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium), 1985, at 607, 627. Elsbernd unfortunately does
not provide the word count for the use of munera. She is surely correct to note that the con-
cept of the munus is more dynamic, evoking «rights which could only be realized in society
and the realization of which perfected the society.» At 629. 
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in the Pian encyclicals are the munera, which provide the teleologi-
cal and social framework for the juridical conception of rights.
III.
The discourse about the munera, developed, as I have said, in
tandem with the idea of subsidiarity by Pope Pius XI, found its way
into work on the Second Vatican Council. Lumen gentium is the
immediate source of John Paul’s social doctrine.27 In Lumen gentium
the concept of munera is made to do at least two things. 
First, to explain the political principle of ruling and being ruled
within the life of the Church. In this regard, the important text is to
be found in the Note of Explication appended to Lumen Gentium.
«[I]t is a question of munera which have to be exercised by a plural-
ity of subjects cooperating hierarchically by the will of Christ.» That
is to say, the Church is a communion of diverse agents having differ-
ent services to render to the whole body. Cardinal Felici explains
that this is a better word than potestates (powers) because without
the munera the powers would appear aimless, non-participatory,
unilateral, inorganic, anonymous (one might say, precisely those
characteristics of the modern state which have proved so troubling
over the past four hundred years).28 The Church is not to be under-
27 Not to overlook the fact that in Mystici Corporis (1943) Pius XII adumbrated this
move. Notice that Pius begins with the Christology of the Sacred Heart (§8, AAS/35 at
196). A chief point of the encyclical is that Christ’s munera are not distributed to the
Church merely to create a juridical union (§9, AAS/35 at 197). The organicity of the
Church requires an analogical approach to the sacra munera (§§15-18, AAS/35, at 200-
202). 
28 Pericles Cardinal Felici goes on to explain that the munera signify, first, that there
are powers already poised to action (ad actum expedita) awaiting canonical and juridical
determination; second, a unique ordering (ex natura rei) of diverse subjects cooperating in
unity. Nota Explicativa Praevia, in Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum Concilium Vaticanum II:
Constitutiones Decreta Declarationes (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), at 215-16. One
cannot fail to notice the similarity between Cardinal Felici’s explication of ecclesial munera
and communio and the social doctrine of Pius XI. 
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stood either as a modern state in which there obtains a single and
undifferentiated sovereign power, nor can it be understood as a
devolution of sovereign power. 
Second, after treating the initiation of the laity, by baptism, into
the triplex munera Christi,29 Lumen gentium (§35) says that the laity
have the munus (here quoting the disturbing passage in Ephesians
6.12) of wrestling «against the cosmocrats of this dark age, against
the spiritual forces of wickedness.» The participated royalty of the
laity (§36) is expressed, first, in conquering «the reign of sin in them-
selves,» and second, by «serving Christ in their fellow men they
might by humility and patience lead their brethren to that King for
whom to serve is to reign.»
The munera are conspicuous in the 1976 Lenten conferences
which Cardinal Wojtyla preached for Pope Paul VI. Within the year,
these conferences were published under the title Sign of Contradic-
tion. The world, Wojtyla proposed, is sorely in need of a “criterion
of power.” He notes that, as St. Thomas taught, to be a creature is to
be endowed with perfections according to its kind. In the second
chapter of Genesis, we see that the created endowment, once
received, was a gift immediately communicated. Adam and Eve
were «bestowed on the other.»30 Here, he discerns the nucleus of the
ontology of the munera. Human beings are not just bearers of pow-
ers and rights, but of a perfection already poised to act in self-giving.
The social function is apparent at the very beginning in the institu-
tion of marriage.
Two points deserve attention. First, he contends that regalitas
(the quality or property of ruling) is «embedded within the structure
of the human personality.»31 This point is important because he does
not want to argue that the munera are merely a theological template
laid over the condition of natural man. Second, he emphasizes that
29 In §31: «These faithful are by baptism made one body with Christ and are consti-
tuted among the People of God; they are in their own way made sharers in the priestly,
prophetical, and kingly functions of Christ; and they carry out for their own part the mis-
sion of the whole Christian people in the Church and in the world.»
30 ID., VII.1 at 55. 
31 ID., at 138.
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the munus regale «is not the right to exercise dominion over oth-
ers.»32 True, he argues, praxis is «a manifestation of the ‘kingly char-
acter’ of man»; but this kingship over the world of matter is not to
be confused with two other notes of kingship — self mastery and self
gift.33 When he promulgated the 1983 Code of Canon Law, the Pope
remarked: «In the wake of the Second Vatican Council, at the begin-
ning of my pastoral ministry, my aim was to emphasize forcefully the
priestly, prophetic and kingly dignity of the entire People of God.»34
Indeed, in his first encyclical he proposes that human dignity
has to be rediscovered as a “kingship” [regalitas], a notion, he adds,
that is «linked to every sphere of Christian and human morality.»
Ruling has three characteristic activities. First, in the person, regali-
tas means the act of self-mastery made mature by virtue. Second, in
the world, regalitas means the act of dominion over physical things,
signifying the priority of spirit over matter. In Laborem exercens
(1981), for example, he treats the problem of human labor in light of
the triplex munus Christi (§24) — sorting out how dominion over
things relates to ruling oneself and ruling others. Third, in the social
world, regalitas is expressed in acts of service, according to Mt.
20.28, serving rather than being served.35 In his biography of the
32 ID.
33 ID., at 139. 
34 On the ratio novitatis see the Apostolic Constitution Sacrae Disciplinae Leges, 25
Jan. 1983, AAS/75 (1983), at XII; for the pledge to devote his pastoral ministry to the idea,
see the Apostolic Exhortation, Christifideles Laici, 30 Dec. 1988, §14 AAS/81 (1988) at
410f.
35 In Redemptor Hominis, we find all three aspects: «rediscovering in oneself and oth-
ers the special dignity of our vocation that can be described as ‘kingship’» [regalitas]. This
dignity is expressed in readiness to serve, in keeping with the example of Christ, who «came
not to be served but to serve» (Mt. 20.28). If, in the light of this attitude of Christ’s, “being
a king” is truly possible only by “being a servant” then “being a servant” also demands so
much spiritual maturity that it must really be described as “being a king”. In order to be
able to serve others worthily and effectively we must be able to master ourselves, possess
the virtues that make this mastery possible. Our sharing in Christ’s kingly mission — his
“kingly function” [muneris regalis] — is closely linked with every sphere of both Christian
and human morality. §21, AAS/71 at 316. And again at §16: «This is expressed by the Sec-
ond Vatican Council in these beautiful chapters of its teaching that concern man’s “king-
ship”; that is to say his call to share in the kingly function-the munus regale of Christ him-
self [ad communicandum cum Christo ‘munus regale’] [n. 101, cite to Lumen Gentium 10,
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Pope, George Weigel discusses this principle as the «Law of the
Gift.»36 Although the world knows it not, the most primordial law of
ruling is service, which is always the signature of the divine. Not sov-
ereignty as the moderns understand it, 37 but rather a gift communi-
cated for the good of another.38
Here, he is not giving a list of munera. Rather, by focusing upon
the first institution of marriage, he is trying to identify what every
vocation, mission, social station has in common. Marriage was insti-
tuted to transfer into the visible reality of the world the mystery hid-
den from eternity in God, and thus to be its sign. «To understand
man, it is necessary to enter into the mystery of this signum — the
human body, which is the visible expression of the imago dei, and
which at the very beginning discloses a nuptial relationship».39 So,
here in Genesis, we find the original meaning of participated roy-
36]. The essential meaning of this “kingship” and “dominion” [munus regale illudque
dominium] of man over the visible world, which the Creator himself gave man for his task,
consists in the priority of ethics over technology, in the primacy of the person over things,
and in the superiority of spirit over matter.» AAS/71.
36 George Weigel, Witness to Hope (1999), 136-37. 
37 After World War Two, Catholic thinkers generally avoided the word sovereignty.
In Man and State (Chicago: Univ; of Chicago Press, 1951) Maritain insisted that the term
could not be rehabilitated but “scrapped” (see “The Concept of Sovereignty,” at 28-53).
Heinrich Rommen worried that the word was “much tainted,” but decided to retain it,
albeit with 22 pages of qualification. See The State in Catholic Thought (London: Herder
Co., 1950) Ch. XVII. So, too, J. Messner in Social Ethics (London: Herder Co.1949),
§§126-135. I can’t find any of use of term in either Gaudium et Spes or in Dignitatis
Humanae. John Paul II uses the word dominatus in reference to God’s rule (e.g. Evan-
gelium Vitae, §66), or in the negative sense to an exaggerated claim of human autonomy
(e.g. Veritatis Splendor, §35). The phrase sui iuris is sometimes used to designate a self-gov-
erning political community (e.g. Centesimus Annus, §20). 
38 It is an idea well known in the medieval world. In Rerum Novarum, for example,
Leo XIII defended the rights of private associations on the basis of Thomas’s defense of
Mendicant poverty in Contra Impugnantes, written in 1256. In Thomas’s works, every anal-
ogous use of the word societas is mirrored by uses of the word communicatio: communica-
tio oeconomica, communicatio spiritualis, communicatio civilis, and so forth. The word com-
municatio simply means making something common, one rational agent participating in the
life of another. Society, for Thomas, is not a thing, but an activity. He quotes Augustine’s De
Doctrina Christiana: «Everything that is not lessened by being imparted, is not, if it be pos-
sessed without being communicated, possessed as it ought to be possessed.» (Contra
Impugnantes, I.4.) Cap 4 §14 A83 1265-70]
39 See also Pius XI, Casti connubii, §12; AAS/22 (1930) at 544.
Russell Hittinger 401
alty.40 Divine rule is made visible in (1) mastery over one’s own body,
(2) dominion over things of the earth, (3) in reciprocal rule over one
another’s bodies. Interestingly, the first sign of the social munus
regale is not the state but rather what the Pope calls the “proto-
sacramental” institution of matrimony.
In Mulieris Dignitate (1988) he continues this line of inquiry
into the difference between ruling things and ruling persons. With
sin, the first note of ruling (self mastery) is eroded, and the second
note of ruling (dominion over physical things) is extended to the
rule of persons — in Genesis 3.16 (“he shall rule over you”) it might
look as though Adam now rules Eve by way of dominion appropri-
ate to the rule over the things of the world. Thus, Genesis 3.16 must
be compared with 1 Cor. 7.3-4, «For the wife does not rule over her
own body, but the husband does; likewise, the husband does not
rule over his own body, but the wife does.» Christ reveals the «royal
dignity of service» by teaching that «to serve means to reign.»41
Assuming in his own person «humanity as the inheritance of
Adam,» Christ decisively answers the question posed in Psalm 8,
quid est homo?42 He «fully reveals man to himself,» among other
ways, by restoring the institution of matrimony, relocating it in the
rule of persons rather than the dominion over things. (In passing, we
can note that the Pope frequently refers to the threefold concupis-
cence mentioned in 1 John 2.16 — lust, curiosity, and pride; these
are the opposites of the three munera Christi: lust degrades the
40 In Dominus et Vivificantem (1986), John Paul comments on a passage in Gaudium
et Spes: «when God is forgotten the creature itself becomes unintelligible.» Dominus et viv-
ificantem, §11, citing Gaudium et Spes §36. Among the things which become beclouded
and distorted is man’s vocation to rule and be ruled. The Pope turns to the issue of human
conscience, created and redeemed to participate in divine rule. An alert reader will see that
many of the themes later explored in Veritatis Splendor — the idea of “participated theon-
omy” and of human conscience as the “herald of a king” — were first explored in the
encyclicals on the Trinity. Participated theonomy, Veritatis Splendor, §41, AAS/85 (1993),
at 1166; the nuncio of a King, §58, AAS/85 at 1179 [citing Bonaventure, In II Librum Sen-
tent., dinst. 39, a. 1, q. 3]; see also his discussion of the imago dei, bearing the kingly pred-
icate, §38, AAS/85 at 1164 [citing Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis Opificio, c. 4].
41 Mulieris Dignitate §5 AAS/80 1661. 
42 ID., §11, AAS/80 1679.
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priestly offering of the body, curiosity degrades the munus
propheticum, or the light of teaching, and pride degrades the munus
regale, the virtue of kingly rule. By the created order, man has some
share in these three munera, but in the rule of the God-Man, Jesus
Christ, these natural endowments are not only clarified and healed
by the medicine of grace, but are transfigured and elevated).
Modern political theology was shipwrecked on just this prob-
lem of failing to sort out the three kinds of regalitas — specifically, in
relation to the family. Recall for a moment that modern contract the-
orists (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) assumed that legitimate power
requires the location of a sovereign; moreover, they assumed that
Christian theologians affirmed with one voice that the evidence or
what they called “marks” of sovereignty are to be found chiefly in
paternal power given to Adam. Bossuet, for instance, asserted that
«all the world agrees that obedience, which is due to public power,
is only found (in the Decalogue) in the precept which obliges one to
honor his parents….and that the name ‘king’ is a father’s name.»43
The Enlightenment thinkers criticized this idea because it seemed to
be an ideology of monarchical absolutism. 
But rather than asking the question whether the primary analo-
gate of kingship is matrimony rather than paternal power, much less
whether paternal power is mere dominion, the debate hurried to the
inevitable conclusion that Adam is no king and that Genesis dis-
closes nothing useful about ruling powers. The traditional theology
of social roles, or munera, could be dismissed as despotism. And to
counteract it, Enlightenment thinkers simply transferred the con-
cept of dominion to the individual’s relation to himself; on this sup-
position, it was a small step to propose that legitimate rule of any
sort can arise only by consent or contract; the social world, then, is
to be built by acts of commutative justice — social forms and norms
are mere constructions, legitimated by contractual negotiation. 
43 Bossuet, Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture (1670), III.3. To be
sure, Bossuet contends that kingship is service, but from the platform of an absolute power
under God. 
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In the Apostolic Exhortation, Familiaris Consortio (1981) —
subtitled, «On the Munera of the Christian Family44 — the Pope
says that although the “kingly mission” is not to be reduced to poli-
tics, the proper and unique vocation of the laity includes what he
calls the munus sociale et politicum. This Exhortation was issued on
the Feast of Christ the King; the preface of that liturgical feast is
quoted in LG §36, where we also find the formula cui servire regnare
est used so often by John Paul. Here, he quotes this formula
again».45 The laity are to order temporal things according to the reg-
num Dei. 
The social role [Sociale munus] that belongs to every fam-
ily pertains by a new and original right to the Christian
family, which is based on the sacrament of marriage. By
taking up the human reality of the love between husband
and wife in all its implications, the sacrament gives to
Christian couples and parents a power and a commitment
to live their vocation as lay people and therefore to ‘seek
the kingdom of God by engaging in temporal affairs and by
ordering them according to the plan of God.’ [Lumen gen-
tium §31]. The social and political role [Sociale et policitum
munus] is included in the kingly mission of service in
which Christian couples share by virtue of the sacrament of
marriage, and they receive both a command which they
cannot ignore and a grace which sustains and stimulates
them.46
Here, John Paul follows the ontology first developed by Pius
XI. The iura are located in the munera.
The Pope in Familaris is not immediately interested in political
constitutions, political parties, or a specific legislative agenda.
44 Familiaris Consortio: De Familiae Christianae Muneribus (22 Nov. 1981); AAS/73
(1981). 
45 ID. §63, AAS/73 at 156.
46 ID. §47, AAS/73 139.
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Rather, he has two points in mind. First, despite the translator, John
Paul wanted to make clear that social offices and vocations are not
constructed out of abstract rights. Second, that munus politicum is
properly the service of laity, not priests. The munus regale is analog-
ical. The kingly service of a priestly hierarchy must be distinguished
from the service of the laity in the temporal order. The virtues of
social justice cannot be stripped from social roles.
These thoughts are made even more clear in Christifidelis Laici
(1988).
A new aspect to the grace and dignity coming from Bap-
tism is here introduced: the lay faithful participate [par-
ticipes], for their part, in the threefold munus of Christ as
Priest, Prophet and King. This aspect has never been for-
gotten in the living tradition of the Church, as exemplified
in the explanation which St. Augustine offers for Psalm 26
[here follows a quote from Augustine]: «David was
anointed king. In those days only a king and a priest were
anointed. These two persons prefigured the one and only
priest and king who was to come, Christ (the name
“Christ” means “anointed”). Not only has our head been
anointed but we, his body, have also been anointed ...
therefore anointing comes to all Christians, even though in
Old Testament times it belonged only to two persons.
Clearly we are the Body of Christ because we are all
“anointed” and in him are “christs”, that is, “anointed
ones”, as well as Christ himself, “The Anointed One”».47
In medieval political theology, the venerable image of sponsus
and sponsa, Christ and his bride, was diverted from its proper and
original context, in the sacrament of baptism, and was made to
define the relations between the prince and his state. The King was
given a ring to signify his solemn marriage to the realm. Before the
47 Christifidelis Laici — Apost Exhort (30 Dec. 1988) §14; AAS/81 (1989) at 410,
Enchiridion Vaticanum vol. 11 at 1050. 
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age of Absolutism, the office of king exemplified the sanctified laity
— these coronation rituals, properly understood, represented the
dignities bestowed on every Christian at the time of his baptism.
Interestingly, in his panegyric to Constantine, Eusebius of Caesarea
contended that when Genesis teaches that man was made in the
image and likeness of God it should be inferred that God made
Adam and Eve not a political animal, but a basilikon zoon, a royal
animal; hence, Eusebius reminds the reader that the restoration of
the imago dei in Christ is a work participated by all baptized per-
sons.48 Though never entirely lost, the munus regale of the laity had
been displaced before the Revolution destroyed the office of
anointed kings. In early modernity, political Christendom devolved
into an Old Testament model of two anointed rulers. As the Pope
remarks, although the munus regale of the laity was never entirely
forgotten, it was eclipsed, for all practical purposes, by the mon-
archs and their courts, who jealously guarded what they deemed an
exclusive title to the kingly predicate.
From a theological point of view, political modernity did not fix
the problem because it did not restore the status of regalitas to the
people. Modern regimes might accommodate the anointing of
priests so long as the munus regale of the priest is confined to a pri-
vate or merely spiritual sphere. For their part, the baptized laity in
modern times are considered citizens, whose chief responsibility is
to legitimate political power — as a people, however, they reign
without ruling. They have an abstract power, but no munus regale.
Thus, the theological anthropology of participated royalty seems
irrelevant to citizenship. Or, to put it in another way, the social
residue that remains after we subtract the power of the state is
deemed a merely private sphere. In Catholic thought, however, this
cannot be true, at least not in the sense ordinarily given to the word
“private.” For whether the munera proceed from natural law or
from the roles immediately instituted by Christ, the offices, func-
tions, and powers are under law. There is no such thing as a purely
private person. Therefore, the state is not limited by a private sphere
48 Tri. Orat. IV.
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but rather by a truly, though analogously, public sphere of social
forms and norms. This is why modern popes insisted that the plu-
rality of social forms deserves not only immunity from state power
but more importantly recognition as public entities having their own
propria. On this view, the principle of subsidiarity has a social con-
text in which to work. 
IV.
John Paul continued the work of Pius XI, Pius XII, and the Vat-
ican Council in putting issues of powers (potestates) and rights (iura)
in the context of munera. Here we find perhaps the deepest and
most searching element in modern Catholic social thought. It is
prominently displayed in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church:
God has not willed to reserve to himself all exercise of
power. He entrusts to every creature the munera it is capa-
ble of performing, according to the capacities of its own
nature. This mode of governance ought to be followed in
social life….those who govern human communities…
should behave as ministers of divine providence. (§1884)
The idea of participated royalty, plurified in distinct munera,
provide the context for the issues of social pluralism and subsidiar-
ity. This social doctrine interweaves social theory, anthropology,
political and moral philosophy, and several branches of theology
with the ancient metaphysical theme of participation. It is extraordi-
narily synthetic. But there is a reason for the synthetic approach. By
the time of the Second Vatican Council it was clear that Catholicism
and Liberalism provided converging lines of support for the exter-
nal organization of liberty: constitutionally limited government,
human rights, and the role of free markets (provided that the market
be subject to considerations of the common good). At the same time
it was clear that anthropological foundations of liberty were quite
divergent. 
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Gellner’s “modular man,” for example, is a man without
munera. Civil society is not a theatre in which men freely respond to
natural and supernatural munera, but quite the opposite; civil soci-
ety is a zone of immunities from society itself. For good reason,
therefore, Catholic social doctrine had to enrichen and deepen the
Church’s understanding of the anthropology and social ontology.
This effort practically defines the teachings of the current papal
magisterium. If one reads an encyclical like Centesimus annus
(1992), one will discern what is, by now, a familiar dialectic. On the
one hand, the Church affirms the post-1945 western consensus
about the external organization of liberty, while proposing a differ-
ent conception of man and society. The principles of social pluralism
and subsidiarity should be read in light of that dialectic.
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